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An Appreciative Note on Mr. Justice Douglas'
View of the Court's Role in Environmental Cases
PATRICK BAUDE*

Probably the most visible feature of William 0. Douglas' public
career as a citizen has been the inspired passion with which he campaigns for the importance of the uncivilized wild for civilized men and
women. In his writings off the Court, most notably A Wilderness Bill
of Rights in 1965, he has blended eloquent nature-writing with concrete suggestions for institutional reform.' Within the movements we
now call environmental there are many strains: some worry about
changing the diseases which automobile exhaust will inflict on us and
altering the means by which inert substances may be extracted from
their containers. Others (although of course the two groups are overlapping and both reflect to some degree vital concerns of most nonsuicidal people) champion trees and lakes and birds either for their
own sake or for the dignity and beauty they can lend to troubled and
2
hectic human life.
These latter champions, of which William 0. Douglas is one, are
not unaware that wilderness by definition cannot be made part of the
daily experience of two hundred million people. As a result, "[m]uch is
made of the point that those who love the wilderness are not only in
the minority but from upper classes who can afford the luxury of trail
travel." 3 Douglas' reply is based in part on the fact that opportunity
for access to the wilderness is not limited to the wealthy 4 -even if
some find it hard to shake the belief that here the poor are undergraduate scholarship students rather than welfare mothers-and in larger
part on the importance of providing opportunities for any minority.
"Those who love the wildness of the land and who find exhilaration in
backpacking and sleeping on the ground may be idiosyncratic; but they
represent values important in a free society."'
* Professor of Law, Indiana University, Bloomington.

' For balanced criticism of some of the specific suggestions, see Tarlock, Book Review,
19 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1967).
2 See generally

3.

PASSMORE, MAN'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR NATURE (1974).

3 W. DOUGLAS,

A

WILDERNESS BILL OF RIGHTS 18 (1965).

4 Id. at 18-19.
5
1 d. at 26.
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In whatever way history assesses Mr. Justice Douglas' public career
as a judge, it will not find him one whose greatest goal was to divorce
value or personal view from constitutional decision. It would thus
hardly be surprising if the Justice's opinions in environmental cases
dramatized the man's view of nature's dominant virtues. But in fact,
Mr. Justice Douglas' opinions reflect in the main an institutional concern that the values of wilderness receive appropriate attention from
those who must accommodate them with other interests and not a demand that the natural minority prevail.
The easiest way to ensure the prevalence of that minority Would
be to hold that there is a constitutionally protected right to environmental protection. Indeed the place to begin such an argument would
now be the Douglas opinion for the Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,'
which, as John Hart Ely has pointed out, is not so indefensible as are
the uses to which it has been put.7 One way to ennoble a new constitutional right is by the simple force of assertion that it must be so, or
has always been so but never before needed judicial articulation.8 Another way is to demonstrate, however sketchily,9 an implicit connection
between the right in question and an explicit text of the Constitutionthe "emanations" and "penumbras" of Griswold. A third method is
to derive from the paradoxes of judicial review the conclusion that the
structure of representative democracy requires certain features, such as
the right to vote or to be free of economic discrimination by legislation
one has no right to participate in.'" The case for the environment is
easiest made under the first method, but only because any case can be
made by assertion. The case can be made under the second method
largely by arguments approximating bad puns-pantheists worship nature, wilderness "speaks" to the human condition. The case might be
made more seriously under the third method. A majoritarian legislature could be said to have the power to rule, absent compelling reasons,
only over those who are entitled to a fairly representative role in influencing those political determinations.
We deal not with transitory matters but with the very earth itself.
We who come this way are merely short-term tenants. Our power
in wilderness terms is only the power to destroy, not to create. Those
6381 U.S. 479 (1965).

The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973).
8
E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7Ely,

9 E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969).
10
Cf. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938); South Carolina v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184 n.2 (1938).
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who oppose wilderness values today may have sons and daughters who
will honor wilderness values tomorrow. Our responsibility as life tenants is to make certain that there are wilderness values to honor after
we have gone."
The real difficulty is not in discovering a pedigree for the environment so much as it is in giving practical effect to the view that such a
constitutional right exists.' 2 An injunction or declaratory judgment
that oil not be spilled on the shore could be expected to expose its issuer
to the fate of King Canute. Even so, the interests involved are so fundamental-so rooted in our past values, if not our Constitution, and so
critical to our posterity if not to our domestic tranquility-that they
should be recognized in order to assure their full consideration in governmental decisions. The law, after all, knows many rights whose importance it protects vigorously but which ought not to be the basis for
invalidating legislation.
One of the most respectable ways, for example, in which courts
use general considerations of social or economic policy is to uphold
legislation which might otherwise be found to overreach a loosely defined power." Thus it was not a surprising opinion by Mr. Justice
Douglas in which the Supreme Court recognized that Congress does
not violate the fifth amendment by taking property for purposes not
immediately practical:
The concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values it
represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the
community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as
clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled. In the present case,
the Congress and its authorized agencies have made determinations
that take into account a wide variety of values. It is not for us to reappraise them. If those who govern the District of Columbia decide
that the Nation's Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary,
there is nothing in the Fifth Amendment that stands in the way."
The interest in that case was the development of a sanitary (or even
sterile) urban aesthetic rather than natural beauty; but Mr. Justice
Douglas makes the connection with a revealing metaphor: "The misery
of housing may despoil a community as an open sewer may ruin a
river."'" More surprisingly to those who read Mr. Justice Douglas'
I IW. DOUGLAS, A WILDERNFSS BILL or RIaTS 26 (1965).
12

See the brief discussion in C. MEYERs & A. TARLOcK, WATER RESOURCE MANAGE,-

(1971).
'3 See Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 Sup.
" Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954) (citation omitted).
IsId.

MENT 961

CT. REv. 75.
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concurring opinion in Moreno 6 as a simple ideological defense of the
commune, he again followed a course of deference to legislation asserted
to promote the value of an uncongested residential environment through
the exclusion of large non-family living groups."
Recognition that environmental ends are important and constitutionally legitimate goals for governmental action in turn influences the
way statutes with unclear purposes are read. In Udall v. FPC,'8 the
Supreme Court was called upon to mediate a conflict between the Federal Power Commission and the Secretary of the Interior. The Commission had determined that a particular hydroelectric power project
was in "the public interest"; the Secretary of the Interior sought to reopen the administrative record in order to expand his earlier efforts to
show that alternative power sources made immediate private development inappropriate. The Court's opinion, by Mr. Justice Douglas, did
not require that the Secretary's view prevail; but it did require that
the FPC develop the fullest possible record on an expanded view of
what was in the public interest.
The test is whether the project will be in the public interest. And that
determination can be made only after an exploration of all issues
relevant to the 'public interest', including future power demand and
supply, alternate sources of power, the public interest in preserving
reaches of wild rivers and wilderness areas, the preservation of anadromous fish for commercial and recreational purposes, and the protection of wildlife.'
If the Court is wrong in its judgment of what Congress deems the
public interest, the remedy is easy in Congress. What the Court has
done, in any event, is to make sure that the interests of the inarticulate
future will be expressed as thoroughly as possible before present energy
demands have their way.
The same theme may be found throughout the modern law of preemption,"0 strikingly illustrated in the recent case of Burbank v. Lockheed.2 ' The issue there was whether the city of Burbank could, in the
interest of regulating aircraft noise, impose a nighttime curfew on jets
at the local privately-owned airport. Federal legislation, amply surveyed
both in Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion and in Mr. Justice Rehn6
1Department
of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).

' 7 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
18387 U.S. 428 (1967).

191d. at 450.
generally Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. Rxv. 208 (1959).
21 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
20See

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 51:1

quist's dissent for himself and three others, evinced great concern with
aircraft noise but was totally silent on the precise question-perhaps because one of the ways in which Burbank is unique is that it seems to
be the only city where commercial flights use a privately owned airport,
requiring legislative rather than proprietary authority to curtail night
flights. If the preemptive intention of Congress were the key, nearly
mystic qualities would be needed to divine what the Congress thought
about the Burbank airport when it was thinking about something else
instead. If immediate concern about the quality of the environment
were the key, the curfew would be sustained. And earlier important
cases on compensation for taking show Mr. Justice Douglas no defender
of aircraft noise. 2 If the key is to make sure that interests in quiet are
coordinated across the country and balanced against needs for safety
and efficiency (recognizing possibilities such as the design of less noisy
engines and different flight paths) federal preemption until the FAA
and EPA complete the studies and rule-making directed by the Noise
Control Act of 197223 makes most likely an efficient solution to the
problem. "Flexibility is gained by deciding a case on the pre-emption
ground rather than on some other constitutional basis because pre24
emption decisions invite congressional reconsideration and adjustment.
A wrong decision should not be justified on the basis that it is
easier to reverse than a right one. But when answers are unclear and
the possibility of environmental degradation threatens more than the
ordinary legal sort of irreversibility, postponing final decision until fuller
consideration is an independent virtue. That place for the "right to a
decent environment" is the place Mr. Justice Douglas has found for it
in the common law surrounding the Constitution.
22 Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S.

256 (1946).
23 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. 1973).
24 Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New" Canon of Construction, 12 STAN.
L. REv. 208, 225 (1959).

